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Population-based surveillance for unexplained death and critical illness possibly due to infectious causes
(UNEX) was conducted in four U.S. Emerging Infections Program sites (population 7.7 million) from May 1,
1995, to December 31, 1998, to define the incidence, epidemiologic features, and etiology of this syn-
drome. A case was defined as death or critical illness in a hospitalized, previously healthy person, 1 to 49
years of age, with infection hallmarks but no cause identified after routine testing. A total of 137 cases
were identified (incidence rate 0.5 per 100,000 per year). Patients’ median age was 20 years, 72 (53%)
were female, 112 (82%) were white, and 41 (30%) died. The most common clinical presentations were
neurologic (29%), respiratory (27%), and cardiac (21%). Infectious causes were identified for 34 cases
(28% of the 122 cases with clinical specimens); 23 (68%) were diagnosed by reference serologic tests,
and 11 (32%) by polymerase chain reaction-based methods. The UNEX network model would improve
U.S. diagnostic capacities and preparedness for emerging infections.
he 1992 Institute of Medicine report—Emerging Infec-
tions, Microbial Threats to Health in the United States
(1)—highlighted the need for a more effective means to detect
emerging infectious diseases. In response to this report and as
part of the Emerging Infections Program (EIP) (2), the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) collaborated with
state health departments and academic institutions to develop a
pilot surveillance strategy for early detection of new and
unrecognized infectious diseases in the United States. This
project—Surveillance for Unexplained Deaths and Critical Ill-
nesses Due to Possibly Infectious Causes—was developed on
the basis of two observations. The first was the realization that
supposedly new infectious diseases identified in the United
States in recent decades had been occurring long before they
were recognized and identified. The second was important
progress in molecular diagnostic methods, which in some
instances has allowed new infectious agents to be identified
and characterized with molecular probes, making in vitro culti-
vation unnecessary.
In 1995, we initiated population-based surveillance for
unexplained deaths and critical illnesses due to possibly infec-
tious etiologies (UNEX) at four U.S. sites. The objectives of
this effort were to define the incidence, epidemiologic fea-
tures, and possible causes of these deaths and illnesses; create
a bank of clinical specimens for future testing as new patho-
gens and methods are identified; and assist in building U.S.
capacity for detecting and responding to uncommon and previ-
ously unrecognized pathogens. This report describes the meth-
ods we developed to reach these goals and the results of the
first 3.5 years of surveillance. 
Methods
Surveillance Sites
Population-based surveillance for UNEX was initiated on
May 1, 1995, among persons 1 to 49 years of age residing in
the San Francisco Bay area (Alameda, Contra Costa, and San
Francisco Counties) of California (n=2,168,810); in New
Haven County, Connecticut (n=556,592); in the entire state of
Minnesota (n=3,419,760); and among persons 1 to 39 years of
age residing in Oregon (n=1,544,466).2 All these sites were
participants in the EIP, and the total population targeted for
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2Oregon used a different age cut-off because of limited resources.
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surveillance was 7.7 million. We report the results of surveil-
lance for cumulative cases through December 31, 1998.
Case Definition 
An UNEX case was defined as illness in a previously
healthy resident of a surveillance area who was 1 to 49 years
old (1 to 39 years old in Oregon) and who died or was hospi-
talized with a life-threatening illness with hallmarks of an
infectious disease for which no cause was identified through
routine testing initiated by health-care providers. A previously
healthy person was defined as a patient without a preexisting
known systemic, chronic medical illness diagnosed before the
acute onset of the UNEX. Such preexisting conditions
included malignancy; HIV infection; chronic cardiac, pulmo-
nary, renal, hepatic, or rheumatologic disease; or diabetes mel-
litus. Patients were also excluded from the study if they had
received any immunosuppressive therapy, had evidence of
toxic ingestion or exposure, had trauma before their illness, or
acquired their illness >48 hours after hospital admission
(Appendix I).
A life-threatening illness was defined as any illness requir-
ing admission to an intensive-care unit (ICU). Hallmarks of an
infectious disease were defined as the following: fever or his-
tory of fever, leukocytosis, histopathologic evidence of an
acute infectious process, or a physician-diagnosed syndrome
consistent with an infectious etiology, including encephalitis
or meningitis, fulminant hepatitis or hepatic failure, myocarditis,
adult respiratory distress syndrome, respiratory failure, or sepsis.
Case Finding and Ascertainment 
Patients meeting the case definition were sought at surveil-
lance sites through various mechanisms. Practicing clinicians
in all surveillance sites were informed about the project
through letters and bulletins and presentations at local and
regional professional society meetings. Personnel at some sur-
veillance sites attempted to identify cases more actively
through regular communications with persons working in
ICUs and local medical examiners or through routine review
of ICU admission records. Physicians and other health profes-
sionals were asked to report suspected cases by telephone to
local surveillance site personnel. When a case was reported, a
screening form was completed to determine if the patient met
the case definition. This surveillance system was not designed
to provide timely reporting or testing. 
Surveillance Audit 
To evaluate the sensitivity of the surveillance system, per-
sonnel at all surveillance sites conducted a retrospective
review of death records from their surveillance areas, and three
sites (California, Connecticut, and Oregon) reviewed all hospi-
tal discharge data in their areas for a period of at least 1 year.
All death certificates for the age groups included in the sur-
veillance were reviewed for the presence of specific Interna-
tional Classification of Disease codes (ICD-9), selected for
their potential to identify unexplained deaths due to possibly
infectious causes (3). Persons whose death records included
ICD-9 codes indicating a disqualifying underlying medical
condition were excluded. Once potential cases were identified,
the patients’ medical records were reviewed. If the records
were not available, the primary physician was contacted to
determine if the patient met the surveillance case definition.
The sensitivity of the surveillance system for detecting deaths
(SD) was calculated by dividing the number of deaths (D1)
detected through surveillance alone by the total number of
deaths (D1+D2) detected through both surveillance and death
record review (D2): SD=D1/D1+D2. The sensitivity of the sur-
veillance system (SC) for detecting critical illness cases was
calculated by dividing the number of such cases (C1) detected
through surveillance alone by the total number of cases
(C1+C2) found through both surveillance and hospital dis-
charge review (C2): SC=C1/C1+C2.
Collection of Clinical Information and Specimens 
For patients meeting the case definition, surveillance site
personnel completed a case report form that included demo-
graphic, epidemiologic, and clinical information. This infor-
mation was collected through interview of physicians caring
for the patient, review of the medical record, and contact with
the patient or the patient’s family. Cases were assigned a clini-
cal syndrome depending on the predominant system involved,
on the basis of information provided by the physician. These
syndromes included neurologic (encephalitis, meningitis), car-
diac (myocarditis, pericarditis, endocarditis), respiratory
(pneumonitis), and hepatic (hepatitis). Syndromes such as sep-
sis, in which no predominant organ system was involved, were
classified as “other.” The hospital laboratories were requested
to save all remaining clinical specimens obtained as part of
routine clinical management, including biopsies and autopsies.
Laboratory Testing 
For the first 2 years of the study, the project investigators
selected diagnostic tests individually for each case. Decisions
were made on the basis of clinical, epidemiologic, and histo-
logic data; previous laboratory testing ordered by the health-
care providers; and availability, timing, quality, and quantity of
clinical specimens. In the third year of the project, based on
information gained to date, a set of standardized syndrome-
specific laboratory testing protocols was developed for respi-
ratory, neurologic, cardiac, and hepatic syndromes (Appendix
II: available online at URL: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/
vol8no2/pdf/01-0165-app2.pdf). These protocols prioritized
testing based on available clinical and epidemiologic informa-
tion and a differential diagnosis; they guided a first round of
laboratory testing which, if negative, prompted a customized
second round of testing. Cases that did not fit any of these four
syndromes were discussed by the project investigators on an
individual basis.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 2, February 2002 147
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Histopathologic Testing 
Whenever possible, in addition to initial examination by
local pathologists, tissue specimens were examined by CDC
pathologists to help guide further laboratory testing decisions.
CDC pathologists have available a unique set of antibodies
and probes for immunohistochemistry (IHC) and in-situ
hybridization (ISH);3 these and other special studies, such as
chemical stains, were selected based on all available case
information. IHC tests were performed by a two-step indirect
immunoalkaline phosphatase technique with various antibod-
ies (4). ISH tests used digoxigenin-labeled probes with an
immunoalkaline phosphatase staining protocol (5). Positive
and negative controls were run in parallel with case speci-
mens.
Testing for Viral Pathogens
The California Department of Health Services (CDHS)
Viral and Rickettsial Diseases Laboratory was the primary
testing site for viral pathogens other than the hepatitis viruses.
Serologic tests were available for immunoglobulin (Ig) G
directed against 19 viral pathogens and for IgM directed
against 14 of these.4 When only a single serum specimen was
available, the presence of both IgM and IgG was assessed,
either by enzyme immunosorbent assay (EIA), indirect immu-
nofluorescence assay (IFA), or both (6). Paired sera were
tested by EIA or IFA for increase in IgG titer. Additional test-
ing included nucleic acid amplification by polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) for selected viral pathogens if adequate speci-
mens were available (7-9). An increase in IgG titer by EIA
was interpreted as evidence of recent or current infection if the
ratio of convalescent- to acute-phase indices was >1.5; an
index is determined by the equation (optical density [OD]-pos-
itive antigen - OD-negative antigen)/predetermined positive
threshold OD (usually 0.1). The CDHS diagnostic assays for
IgM to B19V, Cytomegalovirus,  Hantavirus (SNV), herpes
simplex virus, MeV, MuV, RUBV, SLEV, VZV, and WEEV
have varying minimum positive values, with indices from 1.0
and 2.0. For the enterovirus IgM assay, which detects the pres-
ence of enterovirus group antibody in serum, a ratio of OD-
positive antigen to OD-negative antigen >2.26 was considered
positive. Agents tested by IFA were considered positive if a
fourfold or greater rise in titer was detected. IFA IgM assays
were considered positive if the staining pattern was distinct for
that agent at the appropriate serum dilution.
Bacterial Broad-Range Ribosomal DNA (rDNA) PCR 
DNA extraction from clinical specimens was performed as
described (10,11). All clinical specimens tested with the
broad-range bacterial rDNA PCR were analyzed by using at
least one of the three following primer pairs: fD1mod (posi-
tions 8-27 in Escherichia coli 16S rRNA gene) (12) and
16S1RR-B (575-556) (13); 8F2 (8-27) and 806R (806-787);
and 515F (515-533) and 13R (1390-1371). PCR products were
characterized by direct sequencing or cloning and sequencing,
followed by comparison with rDNA sequences available in
GenBank (11). 
Criteria for Causation 
Cases were defined as having definite, probable, possible,
or no microbial etiology (Table 1). These levels of certainty for
the causal role of an infectious agent reflected the integration
of several factors, including the relationship of anatomic site
of detection to site of disease, reliability of the method, and
whether the putative agent was a known cause of the clinical
syndrome under investigation. Cases were classified as
explained if results showed a definite or probable disease
cause and as unexplained if results indicated a possible infec-
tious cause or none at all.
Statistical Analysis 
Analysis was performed by SAS 6.12 (SAS Institute, Cary,
NC). Denominators for the population under surveillance,
obtained from the 1992 intercensus (14), included all persons
in the age groups under surveillance at the various sites;
denominators including only previously healthy persons are
not available, and no attempt was made to estimate this frac-
3IHC was available at CDC for the following pathogens: Acanthamoeba
culbertzoni; adenovirus; Bacillus anthracis; Balamuthia spp.; Bartonella
henselae, Bartonella quintana; Brucella spp.; Chlamydia spp.; Coccid-
iodes spp; Coxiella burnetii; Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus;
Cryptococcus spp.; Cytomegalovirus;  Dengue virus;  Eastern equine
encephalitis virus; Ebola virus; Ehrlichia chaffeensis; Enterovirus (Pan-
enterovirus); human enterovirus 71; Flavivirus; Japanese encephalitis
serocomplex group (West Nile virus,  St. Louis encephalitis virus
[SLEV], Japanese encephalitis virus); Francisella tularensis; Group A
streptococci;  Guanarito virus (Venezuelan hemorrhagic fever virus);
Hantavirus; Helicobacter pylori; Hendra virus; herpes simplex viruses 1
and 2; Histoplasma spp.; human granulocytic ehrlichiosis; Human her-
pesvirus 6; HIV-1; HIV-2; B19 virus (B19V); Influenza A virus (FLUA);
Influenza B virus (FLUB); Junin virus (Argentine hemorrhagic fever); La
Crosse virus; Lassa virus; Legionella pneumophila serogroups 1, 5, 6;
Leptospira spp.; Listeria monocytogenes; Lymphocytic choriomeningi-
tis virus (LCMV); Machupo virus (Bolivian hemorrhagic fever); Marburg
virus; measles (Edmonston) virus (MeV); Mycobacterium spp.; Myco-
plasma pneumoniae; Naegleria fowleri; Neisseria meningitidis C; Nipah
virus; Human parainfluenza virus types 1 and 3 (HPIV 1,3); Rabies
virus (RABV); Human respiratory syncytial virus (HRSV); Rickettsia
spp. Orientia group; Rickettsia spp. spotted fever group; Rickettsia spp.
Typhus group; Rift Valley fever virus; Rotavirus; Streptococcus pneu-
moniae; Toxoplasma gondii; Treponema pallidum; Trypanosoma cruzi;
varicella-zoster virus (VZV); Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus;
Western equine encephalomyelitis virus (WEEV); Yellow fever virus;
and Yersinia pestis.
4The following viral tests were used at the CDHS Viral and Rickettsial
Diseases Laboratory: IgG was detected by both EIA and IFA for aden-
ovirus, HHV-6, HHV-8, herpes simplex virus, FLUAV, FLUBV, MeV,
Mumps virus (MuV), HPIV-1-4, HRSV, Rubella virus (RUBV), VZV,
SLEV, and WEEV. IgG was detected by EIA only for Hantavirus (Sin
Nombre virus [SNV]) and B-19. IgG was detected by IFA only for
Epstein-Barr virus (viral capsid antigen), LCV, and RABV. IgM was
detected by both EIA and IFA for HHV-6, herpes simplex virus, MeV,
MuV, HPIV-1-4, HRSV, RUBV, and VZV. IgM was detected by EIA only
for enterovirus, hantavirus (SNV), and B19V. IgM was detected by IFA
only for Epstein-Barr virus. PCR tests performed were Herpesvirus
consensus PCR (6); enterovirus PCR, modified from (7) [Antisense
primer (1R): 5'-ATT GTC ACC ATA AGC AGC CA, sense primer (1L):
5'-CCT CCG GCC CCT GAA TGC GGC TAA T]; and adenovirus PCR
(8).RESEARCH
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tion. Data from the surveillance population were standardized
to the U.S. population by race and age to project the number of
cases occurring nationally. The chi-square test was used to
compare the distribution of characteristics between explained
and unexplained cases. A p value <0.05 was considered statis-
tically significant.
Results
Epidemiology 
From May 1, 1995, to December 31, 1998, 525 possible
cases were reported to UNEX personnel; 388 of these reports
were excluded. The three most common reasons for exclusion
were the presence of a preexisting medical condition (33%),
residence outside the surveillance area (17%), and cause iden-
tified by local health-care providers on further testing (26%).
Among cases excluded for the last reason, 72% had an infec-
tious cause identified. 
A total of 137 cases met the case definition, for a minimum
overall annual rate of 0.5 per 100,000 population. After data
were adjusted for age and race, this rate translates into 920
cases in the United States each year. The overall annual inci-
dence rates remained stable over time, but varied among the
different sites from 0.3 to 2.3 per 100,000 per year. The high-
est rate was in Connecticut, where active surveillance was
conducted in a well-defined population of approximately
500,000 persons. Forty-one (30%) of the case-patients died, of
whom 30 (73%) had autopsies performed, reflecting a rate
much higher than the national autopsy rate of <11% (15).
Cases were reported a median of 6 days from time of admis-
sion to the hospital (0 to 289 days). 
The median age of case-patients was 20 years; 20 (15%)
were 1 to 4 years of age, 53% were female, and 82% were
white. The incidence rates varied by age group (Figure 1) but
did not differ by sex and race. No differences were observed in
the seasonal distribution of cases, nor was there clustering of
cases by time or place. As for exposures, 54% of all cases were
reported to have pets, which is similar to national rates of pet
ownership: 54% to 64% (American Veterinary Medical Asso-
ciation U.S. Pet Ownership and Demographics Sourcebook);
8% had traveled outside the United States in the year before
hospitalization, and 4% had received transfusions at least once
in their lifetime. 
Clinical Features 
Table 2 summarizes the distribution of cases and the pro-
portion explained by syndrome, as well as the syndrome-spe-
cific case-death ratios. The largest proportion of cases
presented as a neurologic syndrome, followed closely by respi-
ratory syndrome. The highest syndrome-specific case-death
ratio was seen among cases with cardiac syndrome (46%) and
the lowest among cases with neurologic syndrome (18%). An
example of a case is described in Appendix III.
Surveillance Audit 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the surveillance audits.
The site-specific sensitivity (SD) of our prospective surveil-
lance for detecting unexplained deaths ranged from 38% in
California to 100% in both Connecticut and Minnesota. Retro-
spective death record review identified 25% to 100% of all
deaths detected through surveillance. Cases detected through
surveillance but not by death record review were missed by the
Table 1. Classification of laboratory test results and cases,a surveil-
lance for unexplained death and critical illness possibly due to infec-
tious causes (UNEX), 1995–1998
AB C
1. Detection of organ-
ism by culture from 
involved siteb
1. Detection of organ-
ism by culture, IF, 
IHC, IEM, ISH, or 
PCRc in blood or 
clinically relevant 
sited
1. Detection of organ-
ism by culture, IF, 
IHC, IEM, ISH, or 
PCR from unin-
volved, but nonmu-
cosal, noncutaneous 
site
2. Detection of organ-
ism by direct immu-
nologic staining (i.e., 
IF, IHC,IEM) at 
involved site
2. Positive serology: 
>4-fold change in 
IgG/IgA titer or sig-
nificantly elevated 
IgM titer
3. Detection of organ-
ism by DNA/RNA 
ISH at involved site
3. Detection of organ-
ism by EMe at 
involved site
4. Detection of organ-
ism by PCRf at 
involved site
4. Detection of other 
specific microbial 
antigen at characteris-
tic site (e.g., urine, 
CSF)
aCase classification: A case was considered to have a definite explanation if the 
organism was a well-recognized cause of syndrome and there was one test from col-
umn A or 2 from column B. A case was considered to have a probable explanation if 
the organism was a well-recognized cause of the syndrome and there was one test 
from column B, or if the organism was not a well-recognized cause of the syndrome 
and there was one test from column A or 2 from column B. A case was considered to 
have a possible explanation if the organism was not a well-recognized cause of the 
syndrome and there was one test from column B, or if there was one test from column 
C, regardless of whether organism is known to cause the syndrome.
b“Involved” refers to the presence of typical pathology. 
cIF = immunofluorescence, IHC = immunohistochemistry, IEM = immunoelectron-
microscopy, ISH = in situ hybridization, PCR = polymerase chain reaction, Ig = 
immunoglobulin, EM = electron microscopy, CSF = cerebrospinal fluid.
dFor example, bronchoalveolar lavage in respiratory syndrome. 
eEM is often nonspecific and may not permit reliable microbial identification without 
further characterization (e.g., IEM).
fSpecific or broad range PCR/reverse transcriptase-PCR; product must be character-
ized beyond size determination (e.g., sequencing, single-strand conformation poly-
morphism, restriction fragment-length polymorphism, or probe hybridization).
Figure 1. The incidence of cases by age group, 1995–1998, the Sur-
veillance for Unexplained Deaths and Critical Illnesses Due to Possibly
Infectious Causes Project (UNEX).Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 2, February 2002 149
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latter because the death certificates did not have the specified
ICD-9 codes. The review of hospital discharge data focused on
one tertiary-care referral hospital under surveillance in Cali-
fornia and the one in Oregon, but included the entire surveil-
lance area in Connecticut (16). Of potential cases identified by
the selected ICD-9 codes, 90% to 96% were excluded, indicat-
ing the lack of specificity of these codes. The sensitivity of our
prospective surveillance to detect only critical illnesses due to
potentially infectious causes (SC) was 13% to 73%. Retrospec-
tively, the hospital discharge review was able to identify 41%
to 81% of all cases detected prospectively through our surveil-
lance.
Search for Etiologic Agents 
Of the 137 UNEX case-patients, 122 had specimens avail-
able for testing; 10 of these had tissue specimens only. Of the
122 cases, 34 (28%) could be attributed to a specific infectious
agent; these agents were classified as definite or probable
causes of the illness, based on our criteria (Table 1). Specific
infectious causes and the laboratory methods used for diagno-
sis are listed in Table 4. Table 5 lists additional infectious
causes for possible cases that did not meet our criteria for defi-
nite or probable causation. All the infectious agents identified
in this study were previously recognized bacterial and viral
pathogens. One patient, admitted because of syncope, was
found to have a complete heart block and had evidence of
simultaneous infection with Borrelia burgdorferi and Ehrli-
chia chaffeensis, which has been previously reported (17). A
number of cases met the clinical definition for various infec-
tious diseases syndromes, including toxic shock syndrome
(five cases), but did not meet our definition for an explained
case. In addition, four cases had evidence of polyclonal sero-
logic response to multiple infectious agents and therefore
could not be attributed to a specific etiology. The proportion of
explained cases was largest among those with neurologic syn-
dromes, followed by those with respiratory syndromes; it was
higher among surviving patients (29%) than among patients
who died (15%), although this difference was not statistically
significant (p=0.2) (Figure 2). Explained cases were similar to
unexplained cases in terms of patient age, sex, and race, but
were reported sooner after admission than unexplained cases
(median 4 vs. 7.5 days, respectively; p=0.1). The proportion of
explained cases during 1998 (7 [17%] of 41), when laboratory
testing protocols were used routinely for first-round testing,
did not differ significantly from the same proportion for cases
enrolled during 1995-1997 (27 [28%] of 96) when no such
protocol was used (p>0.05). 
Clinical specimens from each enrolled patient underwent
an average of 28 laboratory tests (up to 103 tests). The mean
number of tests performed did not differ substantially for
explained and unexplained cases (30 vs. 27, respectively).
None of the cases with only histologic specimens available
had an infectious cause identified. Of the 34 explained cases,
23 (68%) were explained by using serologic tests, 7 (21%) by
specific primer PCR, and 4 (12%) by 16S rDNA PCR. Among
the 122 cases with specimens, serologic testing provided the
highest yield in identifying infectious causes (23 [22%] of
104), followed by specific primer PCR (7 [10%] of 70) and
16S rDNA PCR (4 [8%] of 48). An infectious etiology was
more likely to be identified in cases with paired serum speci-
mens (14 [23%] of 62) than in those with single serum speci-
mens (2 [5%] of 42) (p=0.05).
Discussion
This study is the first to measure the population burden of
unexplained deaths and critical illness from possibly infectious
causes in the United States. To our knowledge, this is the first
public health attempt to describe the features of this problem,
in spite of its clinical complexities. This project established the
infrastructure needed to detect UNEX cases, attempt to iden-
tify their etiology, and ultimately identify new infectious
agents. However, since this project was a pilot study, it was
difficult to standardize many of its aspects. Many lessons were
learned during this project, whether related to the best surveil-
lance methods to use or the laboratory testing process. In
Table 3. Sensitivity of methods to identify cases of unexplained 
deaths and critical illnesses of possible infectious etiology, including 
the prospective surveillance conducted during this project and retro-
spective record reviews
California Oregon Connecticut Minnesotaa
Sensitivity of pro-
spective surveillance 
for unexplained 
deaths (%)
38 72 100 100
Proportion of all 
unexplained deaths 
identified retrospec-
tively through death 
record review (%)
63 100 25 83
Sensitivity of pro-
spective surveillance 
for critical illnesses 
(%)
25 13 73 —
Proportion of critical 
illnesses identified 
retrospectively by 
hospital discharge 
data review (%)
75 81 41 —
aMinnesota did not review hospital discharge records.
Table 2. Distribution of unexplained deaths and critical illness cases 
by syndrome, with proportion explained
Syndrome No. (%)
 No. of 
deaths (%)
No. of explained /cases with 
specimens (%)
Neurologic 39 (29) 7 (18) 15/37 (41)
Respiratory 36 (26) 11 (31) 13/33 (39)
Cardiac 28 (20) 13 (46) 3/22 (14)
Multisystem 18 (13) 4 (22) 3/15 (20)
Hepatic 9 (7) 4 (44) 0/8 (0)
Other 7 (5) 2 (29) 0/7 (0)
All cases 137 41 (30) 34/122 (28)RESEARCH
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addition, data obtained in the first 3.5 years of this project sug-
gest that UNEX occur in previously healthy persons at rates
similar to those of other conditions of clear public health con-
cern and priority (18). Of obvious concern is also the large
proportion of these deaths and severe illnesses that remains
unexplained after extensive laboratory testing. Our findings
highlight the substantial limitations of available diagnostic
tests for infectious diseases and the need for improved tests
and novel approaches to identify infectious disease agents. 
Our surveillance estimated the burden of disease only
among previously healthy persons 1 to 49 years of age. Since a
different age cut-off was used in Oregon, the final rates of dis-
ease were adjusted for age and race. The lower age limit was
chosen to avoid confusion with congenital problems seen in
infants but to include most children in day care, where infec-
tious diseases are common and new infectious diseases might
spread rapidly. The upper age limit was intended to exclude an
expected increased proportion of unexplained deaths due to
noninfectious causes among persons >50 years of age.
Although immunocompromised patients are more susceptible
to a variety of infectious diseases, available resources and a
concern that the clinical relevance of novel microbial findings
would be more difficult to interpret in immunocompromised
persons compelled us to focus on previously healthy persons.
In addition, many of the new infectious diseases first identified
in these persons have subsequently been found to affect per-
sons with normal immune systems (19,20). 
The surveillance methods adopted during this project were
customized to meet the objectives of this study, taking into
consideration the limitations of local resources; therefore
UNEX cannot be easily compared with other classical surveil-
lance systems. The different methods of surveillance used at
the four sites allowed us, through the surveillance audits and
validation, to determine how these differences affected case-
finding. For example, investigators in Connecticut were able
to detect most UNEX cases largely because they conducted
more active surveillance in a smaller population base; in this
site, surveillance focused on all seven hospitals in New Haven
County. At the academic tertiary-care hospital, EIP staff
reviewed ICU admission logs and communicated with clini-
cians daily. At the other six hospitals, a stimulated passive sur-
veillance system was used in which physicians and infection
control practitioners were given reminders several times per
year. The active prospective method captured a greater propor-
tion of total cases (86% of cases at the single hospital) then did
the passive methods (50% of total cases at the six remaining
hospitals). 
If this surveillance is to be expanded, different methods
may be chosen, depending on availability of resources and
overall objectives. Less resource-intensive passive surveil-
lance may be used if the goal is to monitor trends in disease
occurrence. For example, although analyzing all death certifi-
Table 4. Infectious disease causes for explained cases, UNEX,1995–
1998, California, Oregon, Connecticut, and Minnesota (n=34)
Syndrome Etiology (n) Tests (n)
Neurologic 
(n=15)
Neisseria meningitidis (4) 16S rDNA PCR (2), PCR 
(1), EIA IgM (1)a
Bartonella henselae (1) PCR, IFA IgG 
Bartonella spp. (2) IFA IgG
Chlamydia pneumoniae (1) MIF IgG
Mycoplasma pneumoniae (1) EIA IgM/IgG
Cytomegalovirus (1) EIA & IFA IgG
Coxsackie B (1) EIA IgM, viral culture
Enterovirus (1) EIA IgM
Epstein-Barr virusb (1) IFA IgG (VCA and EA)
Human herpes virus 6 (1) IFA and EIA (IgM and IgG)
Mumps virus (1) IFA IgM, IFA and EIA IgG
Respiratory 
(n=13)
Chlamydia pneumoniae (2) MIF IgG (2), IFA IgM
Mycoplasma pneumoniae (4) PCR (blood), EIA IgM/IgG
Streptococcus 
pneumoniae (2)
16S rDNA PCR
 (pleural fluid)
Legionella spp. (1) PCR (from lung)
Adenovirus (1) EIA and IFA IgG
Influenza B virus (1) EIA and IFA IgG
Influenza A virus (1) EIA and IFA IgM, EIA (IgG)
Human parainfluenza virus 
types 1 and 3 (1)
EIA and IFA IgG
Cardiac (n=3) Borrelia burgdorferi/
Ehrlichia chaffeensis (1)
EIA/ IFA flagella IgG, 
Western blot (IgG, IgM)
Enterovirus (1) EIA IgM
Legionella spp. (1) PCR (heart)
Multisystem 
(n=3)
Neisseria meningitidis (1) PCR (CSF)
Adenovirus (1) PCR (blood)
Enterovirus (1) IgM EIA
aEIA = enzyme immunosorbent assay, IFA = indirect immunofluorescent assay, IG = 
immunoglobulin, MIF = microimmunofluorescence, PCR = polymerase chain reaction.
bSee Appendix III for a detailed description of this case. Table 5. Infectious causes for “possibly” explained cases, UNEX, 
1995–98, California, Oregon, Connecticut, and Minnesota (n=34)
Syndrome Etiology (n) Tests (n)
Neurologic  Mycoplasma pneumoniae Remel EIA (IgM/IgG)a
Influenza B virus 
(FLUBV)
Nasopharyngeal culture
Varicella-zoster virus 
(reactivation)
EIA/IFA IgG
Respiratory Enterovirus EIA IgM
Cardiac Chlamydia pneumoniae MIF IgG
Adenovirus EIA IgM
FLUBV IFA IgM
Otherb Enterovirus (2) IgM EIA
aEIA = enzyme immunosorbent assay, IFA = indirect immunofluorescent assay, IG = 
immunoglobulin, MIF = microimmunofluorescence, PCR = polymerase chain reaction.
bOther syndromes included one case with thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura and 
one with hemolytic uremic syndrome.Emerging Infectious Diseases  •  Vol. 8, No. 2, February 2002 151
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cates for UNEX cases would be prohibitively time-consuming,
electronically searching only the certificates in which the man-
ner of death was recorded as natural, undetermined, or pending
investigation could substantially decrease the workload. Under
a passive system, maintaining good communication between
study staff and clinical staff (clinicians, pathologists, and
infection control practitioners) is critical and aided by the pro-
vision of diagnostic testing not locally available (such as sero-
logic testing for hantavirus or toxin testing for botulism) and
timely feedback of study results. Such collaboration may be
critical to early diagnosis of diseases that produce characteris-
tic clinical syndromes (e.g., potential bioterrorist agents such
as botulism) or that are not readily confirmed by clinical labo-
ratories.
Before initiating this project, we had reviewed multiple
cause-of-death data for the United States to estimate the num-
ber of unexplained deaths from possibly infectious causes at
these EIP sites (3). In 1992, the rate of unexplained deaths
among healthy persons 1 to 49 years of age was 8.9 per
100,000 population. The discrepancy between this rate and
that found in our study (0.5 per 100,000) is likely due to the
low specificity of ICD-9 codes in excluding persons with pre-
vious health problems, as well as the problems related to retro-
spective analysis in general. For at least two reasons, we
expect that the incidence of UNEX found in this study repre-
sents only a minimal estimate of the true burden of this prob-
lem. First, the denominator in our calculations included all
persons in our designated groups, since we chose not to esti-
mate the fraction of previously healthy persons in the surveil-
lance populations at the four sites. Second, the differences in
incidence rates between the four surveillance sites and results
of the surveillance audits support the assumption that the over-
all rate detected was a minimal estimate of overall disease.
An important unresolved issue from our study is the large
proportion of cases that remained unexplained, even after
extensive laboratory testing. Although a standardized protocol
for testing was used only during 1998, the proportion of
explained cases before and after this protocol was used did not
differ substantially. Some illnesses may have noninfectious
causes, especially given the lack of specificity in our clinical
criteria for case inclusion and in the features of infection in
general. In cardiac syndromes, for example, myocarditis and
myocardial infarction can have very similar presentations.
Some cases may have been caused by microbial products such
as toxins without the presence of the organism or substantial
amounts of its nucleic acids. Laboratory methods for screening
and detection of toxins remain inadequate. For some patients,
specimens were not available from the primary site of disease,
were severely limited in quantity, or were only available from
late in the course of the disease; in many cases, multiple serum
specimens were not available, autopsies were incomplete, and
tissue specimens were obtained only from unaffected organs.
Finally, the breadth of our testing methods may not have been
adequate. Since broad-range PCR methods were applied only
to bacteria and a limited range of viruses, many other potential
agents may have been missed. Our approach to the detection
of viral pathogens relied more heavily on serologic and immu-
nohistochemical techniques, in part because of the difficulty in
designing a comprehensive set of consensus PCR primers for
all known viral families (21). In our study, viral testing was
also constrained by limited experience with certain IgM
assays. The development, testing, and application of compre-
hensive broad-range viral and fungal consensus primers for
use in PCR assays may be helpful. Through this project, we
created a population-based bank of clinical specimens that
may prove valuable in the search for newly recognized etio-
logic agents, the development of diagnostic tests, and the stan-
dardization of nucleic acid-based techniques for identifying
previously unknown etiologic agents.
This project represents an attempt to build capacity for
early detection and response to emerging infectious diseases
threats in the United States and elsewhere. The usefulness of
this surveillance system for UNEX was recently illustrated
during an outbreak of West Nile virus encephalitis in the north-
eastern United States (22) and an outbreak of unexplained ill-
ness among injecting drug users in Scotland and Ireland (23);
initial reports of illness from both these investigations were
received through the UNEX surveillance project, and initial
testing was conducted through the infrastructure developed for
this project. Future surveillance for UNEX may benefit from
simplified case-finding methods, improved specimen quality,
and more focused syndrome-specific surveillance. Once vali-
dated, surveillance methods may be adopted by the broader
public health community. Such surveillance approaches will
strengthen the collaboration between clinicians, laboratorians,
and public health professionals, leading to improved detection
of unexplained deaths and critical illnesses, including possible
bioterrorism events, and better monitoring of emerging infec-
tious diseases.
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Appendix I
Case Definition, Surveillance for Unexplained 
Deaths and Critical Illnesses Due to Possibly 
Infectious Causes, United States, 1995–1998
Previously Healthy
Patients are considered previously healthy who had no known
preexisting chronic medical condition before the onset of the illness
resulting in hospitalization or death, including malignancy; HIV
infection; chronic cardiac; pulmonary, renal, hepatic, or rheumato-
logic disease; or diabetes mellitus. These patients have no history of
immunosuppressive therapy, trauma thought to be related to illness,
evidence of toxic ingestion or exposure, or nosocomial infection.
Reasons for Exclusion
  1. A history of a malignancy other than nonmelanoma skin cancer
    2. HIV infection identified during hospitalization, previously or
after discharge
    3. History of physician-confirmed myocardial infarction, angina
with known coronary artery disease, or congestive heart failure
  4. Any history of hospital admission for asthma or other pulmonary
diseases except for uncomplicated pneumonia
  5. History of dialysis or chronically elevated blood urea nitrogen
and creatinine
  6. Biopsy-proven liver disease of any kind or chronic coagulopathy
or chronic Hepatitis B or C virus infection as a result of hepatic
insufficiency
  7. Physician-confirmed rheumatologic conditions requiring chronic
or intermittent medical therapy with oral steroids or other immu-
nosuppressive drugs
  8. Any known physician-confirmed diabetes mellitus previously or
during hospitalization
  9. Development of hallmarks of infection >48 hours after hospital
admission
10. Any mention of a history of excessive alcohol use, alcohol abuse,
or alcoholism is a reason for exclusion (e.g., delirium tremens,
withdrawal seizures, alcoholic neuropathy, persistent liver func-
tion test abnormalities, gastrointestinal bleeding, coagulopathy,
or hypoalbuminemia).
11. Any mention of injecting drug use
12. Any history of neurologic disease, including seizures,
13. Obesity, defined as body mass index >30 or “obese” noted in
medical chart
14. Physician-confirmed diagnosis of anorexia
Not Reasons for Exclusion
1. Hypertension or a history of hypertension
2. Any history of inhaler use
3. Pyelonephritis or nephrolithiasis or a history of either of these
conditions in the absence of a chronically elevated blood urea
nitrogen and creatinine
4. History of hepatitis
5. Pregnancy
Appendix II
Algorithm for Meningo-Encephalitis available online only
at URL: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no2/pdf/01-
0165-app2.pdf
Appendix III
An Example of a Clinical Case
Surveillance for Unexplained Deaths and 
Critical Illnesses Due to Possibly Infectious 
Causes, United States, 1995–1998
A 22-month-old boy from Oregon was healthy except for previ-
ous bouts of otitis media, for which tympanostomy tubes had been
placed. Three days before admission, in May 1997, tactile fever was
noted, and one day before admission, the patient had decreased activ-
ity and rhinorrhea. On the day of admission, he vomited twice. In the
emergency room, he had a temperature of 39.2°C, was irritable and
lethargic, and had nuchal rigidity. A complete blood count showed a
total leukocyte count (WBC) of 18,300 (69% segmented cells, 8%
bands). Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) analysis showed a WBC of 54
(25% segmented cells, 75% monocytes), protein 38 mg/dL, and glu-
cose 70 mg/dL. The patient was hospitalized and initially treated with
ceftriaxone. On the next day, he became less responsive, and abnor-
mal posturing developed in the left upper and lower extremities. A
computed tomography scan of the head (without and with contrast)
was normal. He was transferred to a tertiary-care center, where an
electroencephalogram showed moderate generalized slowing and
recurrent right hemispheric electrographic seizures. A magnetic reso-
nance imaging scan done on the same day showed a diffusely
increased white matter signal consistent with viral encephalitis or
acute disseminated encephalomyelitis. The patient received acyclovir
for 3 days. His responsiveness and clinical condition gradually
improved, and he was transferred to a rehabilitation service 17 days
after admission. Initial work-up at the hospital revealed negative
blood cultures and negative bacterial and viral cultures of the CSF.
PCR for Epstein-Barr virus in the blood and CSF was negative, as
was PCR for herpes simplex virus in CSF.
The patient was enrolled in the UNEX project and evaluated.
Specimens available for testing included acute- and convalescent-
phase serum and CSF specimens. A variety of tests were conducted
(see neurologic syndrome testing protocol in Appendix II). Because
the quantities of specimens available were limited, testing was priori-
tized. First-round testing was negative for Cytomegalovirus, HHV-6,
and arboviruses. However, testing for IgG antibodies (by IFA) for
Epstein-Barr viral capsid antibodies showed a fourfold rise in titer
between acute- and convalescent-phase serum specimens; testing for
IgG antibodies (also by IFA) to Epstein-Barr early antigen revealed a
fourfold decrease in titer between convalescent- and acute-phase
serum specimens, indicating acute Epstein-Barr infection.